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ABSTRACT
We use a donor-provider-agent framework to study the delivery of de-
velopmental goods (i.e. aid, credit, technology transfer to poor). The need
to provide incentives for the intermediate provider has been a key issue in
the recent academic as well as non-academic discourses. We show that the
use of high-powered incentives can lead to breadkdown of communications
between the provider and the agents. We study the interplay between incen-
tives and communication failure in the presence of motivated providers who
derive benets from helping the disadvantaged.
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1 Introduction
E¤ective delivery is a critical component of development e¤orts. This paper
examines issues related to the provisioning of developmental goods identied
by two distinctive features: non-commercial intent and reliance on non-price
allocation mechanisms. Examples of these are transfer of modern technology,
technological know-how, loans and grants as well as aid to the poor. We
adopt a donor-provider-agents framework where the donor makes resources
available to the provider for delivery to the agents (recipients). Hence in our
model it is the provider who interacts with the agents.1 The objective of our
paper is to analyze the role of the providers incentives in such a delivery
system.
Various aspects of the delivery system have come under scrutiny in recent
times. A key recurring theme that has been emphasized in the literature
is the need to incentivise the providers. In the context of foreign aid, it
has been pointed out that the providers (aid intermediaries) may not have
the right kind of incentives to see that aid is spent e¤ectively. Easterly
and Pfutze (2008) note that "An ideal aid agency must nd answers to the
problem of zero feedback and unclear objectives". In the context of micro-
nance, great deal of attention has been paid to the issue of incentives for loan
o¢ cers to achieve the organizational goals of the Micronance Institutions
(MFIs). Similar issues arise in the context of government bureaucracy too.2
We look at communication and information ows between the various
layers of the delivery system and the role of provider incentives in improv-
1This framework is certainly not unique to the development context; it is used to study
other domestic programmes like the provisioning of health services, education and many
other public goods.
2See Dixit (2002), Tirole (1994), and Wilson (1989) amongst others for the analysis of
agency and incentives within government organizations. Maertens et al. (2002) contains
an excellent collection of articles on various aspects of agency relations within the aid
conext. Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch (2004) reviews some of the incentive and
agency issues.
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ing these.3 An excellent example of an aid project failing completely due to
poor information ow is the aid project in a mountainous region of Lesotho
(Easterly (2003)). To help farmers in the mountainous region get better
returns on their produce, the project conceived of building roads to link
the region with other areas. However the main e¤ect of this was to allow
grains into the region and drive the farmers out of business as agriculture
was not inherently conducive to the mountainous region. Similar examples
can be found in the context of micronance too. A major crisis broke out in
March 2006 when around 50 MFI branches in Andhra Pradesh (a State in
India) were closed by the Government because of complaints against prac-
tices of these organizations. Some authors, while analyzing this incident,
commented on how indiscriminate lending was making a debt trapfor the
poor.4 It is conceivable that several individuals who (ex ante) had very
small chance of repaying the loans also entered into debt contracts. In more
general contexts, the recent literature on participatory development can also
be viewed as attempts to adopt development practices where there is better
information ow (about local preferences) between the recipients and the
providers.5 The objective of our paper is to argue that in certain sitautions
adoption of the high-powered incentives can lead to communication failures
and hence would be counter-productive.
We focus on a class of transfers where realization of the benets is skill
sensitive. This could simply be a loan for a small project where the success
depends on the entrepreneurial skills of the agent receiving the loan. Be it
social banking or microlending, the objective of these transfers is to enable
3 Information and communication are, of course, important in any organization. Gen-
erally, the economics literature emphasizes either the incentives or the communication
aspects in the organization but does not look at both. See Mookherjee (2007) for a dis-
cussion of some of the issues in the context of organizational design.
4See Shylendra (2006) and Kumar (2006) for detailed accounts and analysis of this
incident. There is also a related litearture on mission drift which looks at problems
associated with the MFIs objective of outreach and proatbility. See Copestake (2007).
5See Platteau (2009).
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the poor and unemployed get better access to funds for entrepreneurial ini-
tiatives (add ref.). Since the scheme is skill sensitive, it may not achieve the
desired objective if loans are distributed randomly. This is also true for situ-
ations of technology transfers like the use of High Yielding Varieties (HYV)
seeds. The HYVs are certainly more productive but they are also more sen-
sitive to know-how and resource base of the recipient farmers. In all these
cases the objective is to transfer resources or technologies to agents with
certain minimum level of skills. If the agents skill level (or other relevant
attribute) is not commonly observed, there can be informational problems.
The severity of the problem can be gauged by the fact that in these situ-
ations, even though some types of agents are likely to worse o¤ than their
present status, they end up receiving the transfers.
Consider for instance a farmer is currently earning some xed determin-
istic income using traditional technology and is considering the adoption of
modern technology with stochastic outcomes.6 Are there situations where
agents with lower expected income can also switch to the modern technol-
ogy? For rational farmers this can happen only if they do not have full
information about the probable outcomes associated with the modern tech-
nology. The question then is how to provide them with this information in
a credible manner. In our example, such information can be made available
by the player called the provider to whom the donor provides the funds
for disbursement. Following the tradition of strategic information transmis-
sion, we model the information transmission from the provider to the agent
as a cheap talk game. It turns out that while providers can successfully
communicate to the relevant agents in the absence of any incentives, the
communication process breaks down in the presence of high powered incen-
tives for providers. For a large class of incentive schemes, the providers
6Note that in any such modernization process it is not possible to rule out lower income
ex-post. But adoption of the modern technology dominates the current practice in an
expected sense.
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announcement regarding the non-suitability of the transfer for certain types
(low success probability of modern technology) is non-credible. Hence even
though the relevant information is available, the agents do not benet from
it and we can obtain highly ine¢ cient outcomes.7
Suppose the provider must incur some cost to acquire the relevant in-
formation before it can communicate. Let us assume that this cost is non-
veriable and hence can not be contracted. In that case, we have a Catch-22
type situation. It is possible that we need to have an incentive system to
induce the provider to acquire information, but by the creation of this in-
centive we render the process of communication ine¤ective. The situation is
improved when we have some motivated providers (a lá Besley and Ghatak,
(2005)) that would acquire and communicate this agent relevant informa-
tion. These motivated providers are driven by the mission to help the disad-
vantaged (low skilled in our context) and derive some private benet from
doing so. However, we also have non-motivated or typical providers who
respond only to pecuniary incentives. The agents have no way of knowing
whether they face a motivated or a typical provider. In the absence of any
high-powered incentives, the presence of these typical providers do not a¤ect
communication between motivated providers and the agents, but with the
introduction of incentives communication breaks down due to the presence
of the typical providers. Hence, in presence of incentives, the motivated
providers are of little help.8
Our paper is related to several strands in the literature and we draw
on many of these sources. The role and signicance of various types of
motivations has received attention by several economists recently. Besley
7This outcome has the avour of the widely known phenomenon called the Dutch
Diseasewhere countries become worse o¤ due to certain kinds of transfers. In our case,
agents are worse o¤ in an expected sense.
8This result has the avor of the earlier crowding out literature. In the market context
introduction of market mechanism eliminates non-market informal mechanims (Stiglitz
??). In individual context, pecuniary incentives may corwd out non-pecuniary incentives
(Titmuss 1970)
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and Ghatak (2005) point out that it might be cheaper to address the moral
hazard problem of inducing e¤ort by careful matching of motivated agents
than the use of high powered incentives. In our case, reliance on motivated
agents may be the only way of solving the issue of information acquisi-
tion and communication. The claim that introduction of incentives can be
counter-productive is not new. A common source of this is the demanding
informational requirements that the designer faces. But a recent literature
shows that even when incentives are appropriately designed, we cannot be
certain of e¢ cient outcomes since these extrinsic motivations might lead to
crowding out of intrinsic motivations.9 In several Principal-Agent experi-
mental settings, it has been noted that stronger incentives and control induce
weaker performances by the agent. Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2008) show that when agents care for esteem, material
incentives may undermine esteem incentives In our case, stronger material
incentives do not crowd out motivational incentives of these providers, but
material incentives enable the non-motivated providers to add noise to the
communication process.
Signalling plays a key methodological role in many of these models of mo-
tivations. Individuals have private information regarding own characteristics
and they try to signal these through generosity, superior performances or
esteem enhancing acts.10 Our model also involves signalling by the provider
(and not the agents) but it is costless. In that sense it is closer to the liter-
ature on strategic information transmission and cheap talk (Austen-Smith
(1994), Crawford and Sobel (1992), Farrell (1995), Krishna and Morgan
9See Benabou and Tirole (2003, 2006), Sliwka (2007), Gneezy and Rustichini (2002),
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) among others.
10 It is not the case that only agents engage in signalling. There are cases where the
principal also signals (through its choice of control, trust, incentive provision) about the
private information held by the principal. In Slikwa (2007), the principal chooses the level
of control over the agents to signal about the average level of trustworthy fair agents in
the population. In Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008), the principal signals its altruistic
characteristics.
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(2001)). It is well known that divergence of interests between the sender
(provider) and receiver (recipient) can lead to communication failure. Our
paper uses this intuition in a simple setting but with the added features that
the sender has to acquire information before communicating and that the
nature of incentive schemes for the provider has the potential to a¤ect the
degree of divergence in interests.
Lastly, we do not attempt to make any general claim about the useful-
ness or otherwise of incentive schemes. Ours is an extremely stylized model
with two sided asymmetric information, which we elaborate on in the text.11
It is known that in such settings it is di¢ cult to sustain e¢ cient outcomes
no matter what incentive structure or mechanisms one uses. However, we
have introduced the possibility of communication and show that some e¢ -
cient outcomes can be achieved in the presence of motivated providers. The
interplay of incentives and communication failure is the novel feature of our
analysis.
2 The Model
We consider a simple variant of the standard principal-agent framework to
study the delivery of developmental goods. Let there be Donor who provides
a xed amount of funds denoted by M to a Provider who then disburses
the funds to the Recipeints ( or agents). Besides making nance available,
the donor also chooses the compensation scheme for the provider. Beyond
that, the donor has no strategic role and most of the paper is about the
interaction between the provider and the agent.
The available nance is to be used to fund several projects to be under-
taken by the agents. Each project costs an amount T , hence a maximum of
M
T projects can be nanced. Note that the funding need not only be cash
11The provider does not know the skill level of the reciepients and the recipients do not
have full knowledge about their success probabilities which the provider does.
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trasfers, it can also take the form of transfer of technology of production.
We discuss the details of this transfer technology, payo¤s, and strategies of
the provider and agents below.
2.1 Agents
We assume that there are two types of agents   high skill (h) and low skill
(l). The total population is denoted by N = nh + nl where nh and nl are
the number of high type and low type agents respectively. We denote the
fraction of h-type in the population by . Each agent can supply L units of
labor in an inelastic manner and is assumed to be risk neutral. The transfer
T enables the agents to pursue a project. The probability of project success
for the high type agent is given by ph > 0. For the low skill agents, on
the other hand, the project success probability depends on several other
factors which are summarized by the state of nature :There are only two
possible states  2 fG;Bg where G denotes the good state and B the bad
state respectively. The project success probabilities of the low skill agent
are given by plG and plB with ph > plG > plB > 0. It is assumed that agents
and the donor do not know the realization of the true state and the common
prior probability of  = G is given by . We assume that the l-type agents
are aware of this value.
In the absence of the project (which can be interpreted as the subsistence
sector using traditional technology) output does not depend on skill type and
is given by
Xi = L i = h; l (1)
where  > 0 and L is the labor input into the production process. Under-
taking the project is risky in the sense that it results in zero output in the
failure state and Yi > 0 when it is successful. Output in the successful state
and expected outputs for both types are shown below.
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Yi = L (2)
E(Yh) = phL (3)
E(Yl j  = G) = plGL and E(Yl j  = B) = plBL (4)
Note that  > . We assume that ph >> ; but plG >  > plB.
Thus when  = G, both types are better o¤ (in an expected sense) by
undertaking the project but the h-type is more likely to succeed. However
when  = B the low skill type is better o¤ using traditional technology and
not undertaking the project. To make things interesting, we consider the
case where the prior  is such that the low types will choose to undertake
the project, i.e.,
fplG + (1  )plBg >  (5)
2.2 Provider
The provider distributes the funds to the agents but is unable to identify the
di¤erent skill types. The provider can learn the true state  but only after
putting costly e¤ort e. To begin with we consider a provider whose payo¤ is
given by U = Z   d(e);where Z is monetary compensation provided by the
donor and d(e) is disutitlity of e¤ort.12 We assume that e¤ort is binary with
e 2 f0; 1g where d(0) = 0 and d(1) = E. The true state can be learnt by
the provider when he choses e = 1. We assume that e¤ort is observable but
not contractible.13 The providers reservation utility is denoted by U  0:
The provider is also assumed to be risk neutral. After learning the true
realization of , the provider can send a fully informative costless signal
12 It is assumed that the donor sets aside the providers compensation and therefore it
does not a¤ect M . Also in the next section we consider motivated providers.
13 If e¤ort were unobservable, the communication game will have to admit possibilities
that the provider can announce G or B without any knowledge of the true state.
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S 2 fG;Bg. It should be clear that the donor has to design a suitable
incentive scheme for the provider so that the latter undertakes desired e¤ort
to gather information about the the state of nature.
2.3 Information and Time Line
Recall that neither the donor nor the agents know the true realization of
 while the provider learns it through costly e¤ort. We assume that the
compensation scheme chosen by the donor Z(:) is commonly known. In the
model the low skill agents know the success probabilities associated with the
good and bad state, but do not know . After learning the the true state
the provider can communicate this by sending a signal S 2 fG;Bg. Hence
we have a two sided asymmetric information situation, but there is scope for
information revelation by the provider in a costless communication game.
Finally, once all projects are undertaken and outcomes realized, the donor
can verify the total number of successful/failed projects.
The sequence of moves in this game is as follows.
1. Donor providesM to nance (MT ) projects and species the providers
compensation scheme Z.
2. Provider chooses e and makes an announcement S 2 fG;Bg.
3. Agents update their belief about  and choose whether to apply for
the project.
4. Provider selects (randomly) a subset of all applicants and transfers
amount T to each of the selected agents. Let n be the total number projects
funded, nh and n

l denote the number of high skill and low skill agents
selected to undertake the project respectively.
5. Outputs are realized and the Donor learns the number of successful
projects (m).
We are interested in studying the impact of various incentive schemes
on the interaction between the provider and agent. Hence our equilibrium
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denition essentially captures the interaction in stages 2-3. An equilibrium
is given by fe; S; ag where e denotes the choice of e¤ort and Sis the
signal. The agents choice is denoted by a : fG;Bg  ! fA;NAg: The agents
choose whether to apply (A) or not apply (NA) based on their posterior
belief (S; ) : fG;Bg [0; 1]  ! [0; 1]. Next we study the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria (PBE) of this game (stage 2-3).
3 Results and Analysis
In this section we rst illustrate the role of communication ine the game.
Then we examine e¢ ciency and introduce the motivated provider. The last
part of this section deals with developmental objectives.
3.1 Communication
In order to demonstrate the importance of communication we begin with the
payo¤ matrix shown below. Observe that the low skilled agent who is the
column player chooses whether to apply or not in the two di¤erent states.
The rst element in each box refers to the providers payo¤ and the second
refers to the low skilled agents payo¤. These payo¤s are for illustration
purposes only and are not strcitly derived from the payo¤ specications
discussed earlier. The high skilled agent is missing from the analysis because
their choice is not a¤acted by the providers announcement. The payo¤s
capture the idea that the agent is better o¤ choosing NA in the bad state,
and prefers A in the good state. In the bad state, the provider also prefers
the agent to choose NA: However, in the good state the providers preference
over the agents choice depends on the relationship between x and x=.
A NA
 = G x; X x0; 0
 = B 0;  Y 3; 0
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Game 1
Suppose, x > x=, it is clear that communication is informative. It is easy
to verify that we have a PBE where
s(G) = G; s(B) = B;
a(B) = NA; a(G) = A;
(G) = 1; (B) = 0
(6)
It is of course true that we also have the uninformative babblingequi-
librium where (s; ) = ; for all s: The agent learns nothing from the
announcement by the provider and the providers announcement s(G) =
s(B). We do not go in to the equilibrium selection issues here and assume
that whenever the fully informative equilibrium exists, player will choose to
play according it.
Now consider a minor modication of the payo¤s to the provider such
that x < x= . In the good state  = G, the providers payo¤ is higher
whenever the agent chooses NA. Now, the announcement of s(B) = B
is not credible because the agent realizes that the provider would like the
agent to believe so even when  = G: Hence the equilibrium described in
equation (6) cannot be sustained. In fact, the only PBE in this case is the
uninformative babbling equilibrium where the agent chooses A irrespective
of the announcement.
3.2 E¢ ciency
Suppose that for a given M , the donor is interested in maximizing total
benets to the recipients. Since the agents payo¤ from not undertaking
the project is xed, this will amount to maximising the expected output
fphnh + (plGnlG + (1  )plBnlB)g subject to the constraints E(Yi j ) 
Xi: These constraints can be viewed as interim participation constraints and
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refer to this outcome as the interim e¢ cient outcome. The solution is given
by
nh = n
 =
M
T
; for nh  M
T
(7)
nh = nh; n

lG =
M
T
  nh; and nlB = 0; for nh <
M
T
Note that this does not involve welfare loss for the low skilled agents in
the bad state. Of course, expost ine¢ cieny cannot be ruled out becasue of
the non-deterministic nature of the output. Interim e¢ ciency requires that
some amount of funds will remain unutilised when  = B, and nh < MT : But
if we drop the above contraints and require complete utilization of M then
the solution would be
nh = nh; and n

l =
M
T
  nh;  = G;B; for nh < M
T
(8)
For the remainder of the paper will focus on the case when nh  MT as it is
su¢ ceint to illustrate the trade-o¤s costly communication and incentives of
the provider. Can the donor achieve this outcome as described in (6)? The
only way this outcome can be achieved is by preventing the l-types from
applying in the bad as well the good state, and it is impossible to achieve
this. Recall that in the absence of any communication about the realized
state, our assumptions about the prior belief  implies that both types will
apply to undertake the project. For the low skill types to revise their prior
belief we need the provider to engage in costly e¤ort and acquire information
about the realized , and then credibly communicate this information. There
is a basic tension between these two. Since e¤ort is not contractible the
provider can only be incentivized by making their compensation dependent
on the outcomes. The number of successful projects m is known ex post.
Hence the providers compensation can be based on a scheme where Z 0(m) >
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0. Since the compensation scheme is assumed to be common knowledge,
the payo¤ matrix in the communication game between the provider and
the l-type agents will be similar to the payo¤ matrix specied in Game
1 with x < x=. We know that the only equilibrium in this game is the
uninformative babbling equilibrium. Hence the benets of communication
are non-existent and the provider is better o¤ not acquiring any information.
For communication to be e¤ective we need Z 0(m) = 0, and for the provider
to acquire information we need Z 0(m) > 0. Clearly it is not possible to have
both simulataneously. We summarize this in our rst proposition.
Proposition 1 Let nh  MT . For any compensation scheme Z(m), both
types apply in all states and nh < nh; n

l > 0; for  = G;B:
3.3 Motivated Providers
Now suppose that we have some providers who are mission-oriented (for
more on this see Besley and Ghatak (2005)). These providers derive positive
private benets which are Rawlisian in nature. In other words, they seek to
maximize the expected benet to the most disadvantaged group   the low
skilled agents. These benets are private to the provider in the sense that
they are independent of the compensation scheme assigned by the donor.
As discussed earlier, we focus on the interim payo¤s.
In state  = G; the (marginal) expected benet to the l-type will be
(plG   )nlN > 0. The providers private benet is maximized when nl
is maximized. On the other hand, in state  = B the (marginal) expected
benet to the low skilled type will be (plB )nlN < 0 and this is maximized
when nl = 0. Thus the motivated providers private benets in our problem
are state dependent. We can rewrite the motivated providers payo¤ as
UM = Z   d(e) + I()nl k   J()nl k=, k= > k > 0 (9)
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where I = 1 when  = G, and zero otherwise. Similarly, J = 1 when  = B
and zero otherwise. This implies that the motivated provider would like
to screen out the l-types in the bad state since they are better o¤ using
traditional technology. From the above utility function it also follows that
for  = G, in the absence of any incentives, the provider would prefer the
l-types to undertake the project. An example of such motivated providers
would be loan o¢ cers working for a MFI who would not advance loans to
someone that is most likely to be severely indebted; not because the MFIs
repayment rates are going to be adversely a¤ected, but because the client is
strictly worse o¤ (in an interim sense).
In this section we assume that the population of providers consists of
both the typical providers and mission oriented providers. We assume that
the fraction of motivated providers is . Recall that the typical providers
simply maximize Z d(e): First suppose that there are no incentives for the
providers, i.e., Z is xed and not performance based. Then with probability
;the provider will choose e = 1 and communicate the realized state to the
agents. With the complementary probability (1  ), the provider does not
observe the realized state as e¤ort is costly. Since the providers e¤ort is
observable, when an agent receives a signal, it knows that the signal must
be from the motivated agent.
We can show that there is an equilibrium where the motivated provider
truthfully conveys the state and the l-types do not apply in the bad state.
Note that given the objective function of the motivated provider, the com-
munication game resembles Game 1 with x > x=. This means the provider
would like the l-types to apply in the good state but not in the bad state
making their announcement credible. Hence the low skilled agent chooses
their strategy as follows: a(G) = A, and a(B) = NA: It is easy to verify
that the typical type provider does not have any incentive to deviate and
acquire information to take advantage of the credible communication:Since
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compensation Z does not depend on the outcome, doing so would simply
lead a reduction in equilibrium payo¤ by d(1) = E. So in this setting, with
probability  we get the outcome where only the high types apply in the
bad state and with probability (1  ); we get the ine¢ cient outcome where
all types apply in both states. However, allocation of projects is di¤erent
from (6). In the good state both high and low skilled agents have equal
probability of receiving the transfer T . In the following we refer to the mo-
tivated provider using and the subscript  and to the typical provider by
the subscript  .
Equilibrium strategies are given by
e = 1; e

 = 0;
s(G) = G; s(B) = B;
ah = A; al(G) = A and al(B) = NA: (10)
The corresponding equilibrium outcome is given by
nh( = G) = 
M
T
; nl ( = G) = (1  )
M
T
;
nh( = B) =
M
T
; nl ( = B) = 0: (11)
If  type provider deviates and choose e = 1, it can send the signal
S(G) = S(B) = B. Given the agentsstrategies this would lead to nh =
M
T
implying that the number of successful projects is highest. However, since
Z is xed, this will mean a lower payo¤ and hence deviation unprotable.
We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let nh > MT and Z(m) = Z. Suppose the motivated providers
payo¤ is given by (9). Then there exists an equilibrium where the motivated
provider chooses to acquire information about the true state and communi-
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cates truthfully. The high skilled agents always apply, the low skilled agents
apply only when the announced state is good. The non-motivated provider
chooses not to acquire any information.
Now suppose the incentive scheme has the property that Z 0(m) > 0.
For the motivated providers this does not change any of the equilibrium
strategies for su¢ ciently large values of k and k0. Consider the equailibrium
strategies given in (10). The motivated providers e¤ort choice is still given
by e = 1: It is clear that they will choose to communicate truthfully in the
bad state. But will it choose s = G when the realized state is G? Depending
on ; Z(m) can be lower according to the equilibrium strategy in (10). But
it is easy to show that for k  k the motivated provider will not devitate
to s = B, where k is given by14
Z(ph
M
T
) = Z(ph
M
T
+ plG(1  )M
T
) + (1  )M
T
k (12)
However, the incentive scheme has a signicant impact on the typical
providers strategies. Given the strategies of the motivated provider and the
agents, the typical providers payo¤ from deviation to e = 1 and s(G) = B
will lead to a higher payo¤ if the following is satised.
Z(ph
M
T
)  E  Z(phM
T
+ plG(1  )M
T
) (13)
It is clear that for given e¤ort level and  this condition depends on the
slope of the compensation function Z. The slope can be interpreted as the
power of the incentive scheme, with a higher slope meaning high-powered
incentives. If compensation is highly responsive to the outcome (in this case
m) then the typical provider will deviate. But once the typical provider also
makes announcements, the agents have no way of separating the typical
14 In the context of crowding out, as discussed earlier, this can be interpreted as intrinsic
motivation being strong enough.
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providers announcement from that of the motivated provider. The signal B
could come from a typical provider in state G, or it could come from both
types of providers in state B: Note that the agents posterior belief  is
monotonic in the prior belief  and the fraction of typical providers (1  ).
If there are large number of typical providers and agents belief about the
underlying state being good is high, all agents will apply even when state
is bad. Hence introduction of high-power schemes leads to communication
failure as shown in the corollary .
Corollary 1 In the presence of high-powered incentives, communication by
the providers may cease to be credible and all agents will apply even in the
bad state. This can happen even when the motivated providers continue to
be truthful.
3.4 Developmental Objectives
The above discussion has brought out the donors objective in to focus. Why
should the donor be interested in awarding the provider in terms of number
of successful projects? As the complete information benchmark suggests
e¢ ciency maximzing donor would like to have all high skilled agents get
the project irrespective of the state. But as we saw it is impossible to
achieve. However, it is not the case that donors have to be interested in
maximizing returns to every dollar spent. Suppose the donor is interested
in only avoiding the worst case- low skill types undertaking the project in
the bad state but has no preference over types in the good state.15 Note
that ex post the provider can observe the total number of failed projects.
First consider the simple scenario where the donor can identify the di¤erent
15This would of course include the case where the Donor would like the low skill agents
to get the project in the good state. If wealth and skill level are positively coorrelated,
one can justify such objectives.
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failed types.16 Consider a compensation scheme
Z = z if nlB = 0; Z = z < z otherwise (14)
This compensation scheme will not change the motivated providers in-
centives. One can choose z; z suitably so that U(e = 1) > U(e = 0) and
U(e = 1) 1 U: What about the typical provider? Now the typical provider
cares about the low skill types only in the bad state and its interests are
aligned with those of the low skill types. There is an equilibrium with
eM = 1; e

T = 1; s
M (G) = sT (G) = G; sM (B) = sT (B) = B (15)
ah = A; al(G) = A; al(B) = NA
Hence communication is e¤ective, in the good states both types apply
and the provider will randomly choose projects. In the bad state only the
high skill types apply and nh =
M
T .
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4 Conclusion
Using a very simple and stylized setting we have shown that introduction of
high-powered incentives can lead to communications failure and undermine
the very reasons for the introduction of incentives. In our view communi-
cation and information ows are vital to the success of many development
projects like aid, micronance and transfer of know-how. It is essential that
communication between the immediate provider of services and the recip-
ients is credible. Incentivisng the providers may destroy this credibility in
16One can argue that the informational requirements of these kinds of schemes are
demanding. This requires the donor to have some kind of audit of all the failed projects.
17When nh < MT this would imply that the provider will not disburse the whole amount
M . This shows that some of the input based incentives where providers are assessed in
terms of the number of projects nanced or amount of funds disbursed are not likely to
be optimal in this case.
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some settings.
While our result is related to the recent literature on intrinsic and ex-
trinsic motivation, the emphasis on information ows and communication
is a novel feature. The mechanism through which introduction of extrinsic
motivations work is quite di¤erent. It does not destroy the intrinsic motiva-
tions of the motivated providers, rather it makes the typical provider active
in such a way that the communication between the motivated providers and
the agents breaks down.
Based on our stylized model we believe that there are two issues which
need further investigation. First, we have assumed (through most of the
paper) that the number of high skilled agents exceeds the number of projects
that can be nanced. Suppose this is not true. Then it is possible that in
some states the entire amount of funds supplied by the donor will not be
disbursed. Some donors who prefer full utilization (disbursement) of funds
will consider this outcome ine¢ cient. But on the other hand, in the bad
state where the low skilled types are better o¤ not undertaking the project,
it is better to have undisbured funds. We have made partial refernce to this
issue but have not investigated it properly.
Secondly, the provider has to always rely on random allocation if the
number of applications exceed the number of projects to be nanced. The
only way the provider can a¤ect the nal allocation is by communicating
and inuencing the agentschoice to apply for projects. This restriction was
imposed to keep the focus on communication. But in practice, the provider
might undertake costly screening of the applications. It is obvious that
costless screening will render the communication process redundant. The
case of costly screening has not been explored here and has been left for
future research.
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